A substantial number of studies have extended the work on universal properties in physical systems to complex networks in social, biological, and technological systems. In this paper, we present a complex networks perspective on interfirm organizational networks by mapping, analyzing and modeling the spatial structure of a large interfirm competition network across a variety of sectors and industries within the United States. We propose two micro-dynamic models that are able to reproduce empirically observed characteristics of competition networks as a natural outcome of a minimal set of general mechanisms governing the formation of competition networks. Both models, which utilize different approaches yet apply common principles to network formation give comparable results. There is an asymmetry between companies that are considered competitors, and companies that consider others as their competitors. All companies only consider a small number of other companies as competitors; however, there are a few companies that are considered as competitors by many others.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, major advances have been made in understanding the structure and dynamics of real-world social, biological, and technological complex networks [1] [2] [3] [4] . Complex networks theory has also contributed to organizational and managerial environments, where new theoretical approaches and useful insights from application to real data have been obtained [5] [6] [7] .
Through theory and experiment, these studies have characterized the structural properties of such networks, their mechanisms of formation, and the way these underlying structural properties provide direct information about the characteristics of network dynamics and function. Of particular interest are scale-free networks where the degree (i.e., the number of nodes adjacent to a node) is distributed according to a power law or a long right tail distribution. Such networks have characteristic structural features like "hubs", highly connected nodes [8] , features which cause them to exhibit super-robustness against failures [9, 10] on the one hand, and supervulnerability to deliberate attacks and epidemic spreading [11] on the other. Modeling real world large interfirm competition networks, which capture the coupling between economic units, is important to understanding the complex dynamics, robustness, and fragility of economic activity.
Here, we use network methodology to analyze and model the spatial structure of a large competition network, representing competitive interactions among firms within the United Page5 international economics, the gravity model of trade predicts trade-flow volumes and capital flows between two units to be directly proportional to the economic sizes of the units (using GDP data) and inversely proportional to the distance between them [45] . In economic geography, the gravity model was used to explain migration flows between countries, regions, or cities [46] , and showed that movement of people between cities is proportional to the product of their population size and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them.
Spatial networks have also been of interest to economic geographers, who have considered networks as a means for understanding urban growth, geographical clusters, international trade, and globalization [28] . These efforts, however, have been mostly metaphorical and insufficiently formalized [29] . In sociology and organization theory, models of networks (including spatial networks) have largely focused on the factors that affect the dynamics of the formation of linkages between members of a network [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] . These empirical studies provide support for preferential attachment type of mechanisms [8] as an important driver of tie selection [34] [35] [36] [37] .
For example, the alliance behavior of multinational corporations indicates that firms will be more likely to have further alliances in the future with increasing experience and connectivity [33, 36] , and an expanding network of interfirm alliances in American biotech exhibits preferential attachment [37] . Geography as a significant determinant of tie selection and network expansion has also been demonstrated. Empirical research illustrates that ties between firms, representing alliances, corporate board interlocks, or investments, are more likely when two firms are colocated [34, [37] [38] [39] . Moreover, studies show that geographical proximity affects the entry of firms in a network forcing them to locate in spatial proximity to industry agglomeration [40, 41] .
In Section 2, we represent real-world data on corporate competition and headquarter location as a directed network in space. In Section 3, we report an asymmetry between the out-degree (number of corporations a firm is affected by) and in-degree (number of corporations a firm affects) distributions. Next, in Section 4, we report that the geographic arrangement of corporate headquarters strongly correlates with population density and that the probability two firms are competitors declines with geographic distance. In Section 5, we develop two models for spatial network growth that yield both the degree distributions and geographic statistics of the empirical network. We present empirical evidence and a theoretical scaling argument showing the close relation between the two models. We conclude in Section 6 with implications for the field of economic sociology. The Supplementary Material includes comprehensive statistical analyses of the various empirical data and models.
II. CORPORATE GEOGRAPHIC COMPETITION NETWORK DATA
The competition network was reconstructed from information records provided by Hoover's -a large business research company that offers comprehensive business information through the Internet on corporations and organizations in over 600 industries. Within the detailed company records, information can be found on location type (headquarters or other); street, city and state address; financial information; industry codes; and competitors list. The competitors list was selected based on various information sources including public documents (e.g., SEC filings), company websites, industry-specific trade publications and journals, and directly from the In order to avoid problems of disjoint maps, we limit our study to firms with headquarters locations in the contiguous United States, for which detailed information on competitors was available. A large firm can also have many local or regional offices where the firm's activities are conducted. For example, Google is headquartered in Mountain View, California, but has branches in other US cities including Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, New York and Washington, D.C. [42] ; a major industrial manufacturer can have its main corporate offices in one city and factories scattered elsewhere. In this paper, however, local and regional offices are not included in the competition network, because detailed and complete information regarding their list of competitors was not available. Still, the focus on headquarters location provides useful and direct information about the characteristics of competition; headquarters regularly gather data and intelligence from other competitors, and use the material collected to generate solutions to complex problems and identify competitive strategies [65] . Also, headquarters depend regularly on overlapping resources (e.g., workforce, investment banks, advertising and media companies, and consulting firms) that tend to cluster near one another. Finally, we will see in Section 4 and 5 that headquarters location is a meaningful quantity with considerable predictive power.
The competition network can be studied by several sampling methods [50] . Here, we use "snowball sampling" (e.g., [51] ) starting from a single node (company), we select all of the nodes directly linked from it, then the nodes linked from those selected in the last step, continuing until a termination criterion is reached. To implement the method, we have created a Web crawler that browses the Hoover's website, and automatically downloads relevant information for subsequent analysis. The sampled competition network was obtained after crawling the web for a period of time that generated at least 10000 nodes --a notably large Page8 network. Snowball sampling is a useful technique when relational data is not given explicitly. In our case, Hoover's maintains the corporate data in a website with the following structure: webpages correspond to different companies, and each webpage includes general data related to the company as well as a list of companies judged to be competitors. Thus, to construct the network, we perform snowball sampling. We begin with a company and collect its list of competitors; in a recursive fashion we traverse the list of competitors to other webpages, collecting more list of competitors and so on. This method could possibly generate a network that does not reflect (in a statistical fashion) the structure of the "real" network, because we start the sampling from a particular node. To eliminate this bias, one can construct different networks by starting the same snowball sampling method from different seed companies. After one computes several sampled networks 1 G , 2 G , 3 G , . . . , one takes the union of these networks (the set of nodes is the union of the set of nodes in 1 G , 2 G , 3 G , . . . , and duplicated arcs are excluded) to get a larger sampled network. The original sampled networks include companies around the globe, while the combined network analyzed is reduced to companies that operate within the United States.
Our sampling of the business information site, combining sampled networks starting from companies whose main activities are in different industries, resulted in a directed network of 10753 companies and 94953 competition links. The average in-degree (or out-degree) of a node is about 9, with 40% of the competition links being reciprocal. We analyze the structure of the strong components of the corporate competition network, and find that it has 420 components:
one giant component that includes 10234 nodes; and 419 smaller components with varying sizes between 1 and 8.
Several observations indicate that one should study the interfirm competition network as an aggregate, rather than subdividing it by industry or company size. First, many competition 
III. ANALYSIS OF IN-AND OUT-DEGREE DISTRIBUTIONS
A competition network can be considered as a directed graph with N nodes and L arcs, where there is an incoming arc to company i v from company j v if company i v lists j v as a competitor.
We compared (see Figure 1 ) the cumulative probability distributions ) ( in k P and ) ( out k P that a company has more than k incoming and outgoing links, respectively. Several common parametric statistical distributions have been considered, and the fit of the different distribution models have been compared using likelihood ratio methods (see Appendices B and C for details). Both the out-degree and in-degree distributions can be described by a stretched exponential function [57, 59] Asymmetric in-and out-degree distributions have been found in other large complex networks [5, 48] . The connectivity of competition networks is important in constraining and determining many aspects of dynamical processes occurring on top of them, such as pricing decisions, strategic behavior, and firm performance. For example, it stands to reason that events and activities of central firms will tend to quickly propagate (due to the heterogeneous outgoing connectivity) throughout the entire competition network, benefiting or impairing the vitality of the interconnected firms. This seems similar to ecological networks, where the loss of a keystone species could have large effects on the network [52] .
We next examine the spatial characteristics of competition networks. The specific latitude and longitude of each company was obtained from its address using Yahoo's Geocoding Web Service, and the distance between two companies was calculated by using their geographical coordinates. In Figure 2 , we compare the geographical deployment of companies with the population distribution in the contiguous U.S. The high correlation found between the spatial deployment of companies and population density is intuitive and may not be surprising [74] .
Indeed, the patterns shown in Figure 2 can be explained as follows [65] . Firms depend and interact regularly with business service providers. Both firms and service providers (e.g., investment and commercial banks, and consulting firms) tend to cluster in areas that can attract and retain a highly skilled workforce; have a large market to their products; and have convenient access to airports, highways, and telecommunication infrastructure. This implies that firms, their competitors, and their business service providers tend to be located near one another, with a bias towards large and densely populated metro areas. Here, however, we attempt to go beyond the simple correlation shown in Figure 2 , and to highlight a similarity (rather than simple correlation) between the actual spatial distribution of companies and the actual population density. The similarity between the two different spatial distributions was explicitly utilized in the competition models presented in Section V. More specifically, in the competition models, firms are distributed on the Earth's surface by sampling from the population density distribution.
From a dynamic point of view, this also points to possible common causal mechanisms that couple the processes of population dynamics and new firm emergence. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTIONS
The corporate competition spatial network enables us to relate competition and geographic distance. Figure 3 shows the probability ) ) ,
that two companies separated
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by a distance l are related by a competition link, indicating that geographic proximity tends to increase the probability of competition. In Appendix D, we consider several alternative models for the probability of competition, and provide detailed information about parameter estimation and statistical model comparison. The results show that as the distance l increases, the decrease in competition probability can be plausibly described as a power-law. However, the fluctuations around the power-law behavior for distances larger than ≈ 1000 km also imply that a model for the presence of competition needs to take into account both geography-dependent mechanisms and non-geographic processes, as explored later in this paper.
FIG. 3:
The relationship between geographic distance and competition. The log-log plot shows the probability that two companies separated by a distance l are related by a competition link. The competition probability is fitted by a power-law The physical distance between nodes in geographic networks plays an important role in determining the costs and benefits of communication and transport. As such, common to many geographic networks is a bias towards shorter links. The competition network analyzed here is of no exception (but perhaps for different reasons). Indeed, we see in Figure 4B that the competition network has many very short links of length 100 km or less. However, the competition network also includes a large portion of links of length 3800 km or less, and then an apparent smaller peak of longer links around 4000 km. Many of these longer links represent continent-wide distances. We show in Figure 4A the cumulative probability distribution that the length of a link is greater than l kilometers. In Appendices B and C we analyze several common parametric statistical distributions, and find that the link length distribution is best fitted by a power law with subsequent exponential decay of the form The geographic nature of the competition network also has an effect on its topological robustness. In network theory, "robustness" refers to a network's ability to withstand attacks,
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Page15 such as random deletion of nodes or the targeted removal of highly-connected hubs. The effect of attacks is typically gauged by the change effected in the network's topological properties, such as the size of its largest component: a network which falls apart into many small pieces upon the excision of a single node is fragile. Power-law networks grown by preferential attachment have been found to be resilient against random attacks, but weak against the targeted deletion of highdegree nodes. Here, we see that the degree distribution is not the only relevant factor in determining robustness; as Figure 5 shows, even after we delete thousands of nodes, the network does not dissolve into disconnected pieces. 
V. MODELING CORPORATE SPATIAL COMPETITION NETWORKS
Motivated by the above empirical results, we develop in this section two explanatory Page16 mechanisms that provide insight on the organization of interfirm spatial competition networks.
The two mechanisms are classified into two types. The first model incorporates a geographydependent mechanism combined with a "preferential attachment" type of rule [8] , where the topology of the competition network evolves in such a way that already well connected companies have greater probability to attract more competition links in a process of positive feedback (the "the rich get richer" paradigm). The first model is particularly appropriate for modeling network formation whose future topology is largely determined by past events that are "internal" to the network. Thus, we also consider a second model where the future topology of the network is determined by "external" information, which is non-topological in nature, and is intrinsically associated with each company in the network. Specifically, the second model incorporates a geography-dependent mechanism combined with a "fitness" type of rule, where companies are assigned an intrinsic quantity or fitness (which could change in time) in such a way that the probability of attracting more competition links is related to the fitness of the company (similar concepts of "fitness" have been used in various studies including "firm size" [69] , "talent" and "quality" [70] , or "status" [35] ). We show that both types of models are able to reproduce empirically observed characteristics of competition networks. More importantly, despite the seemingly different premises of the two models, we provide a scaling argument showing the equivalence of the two models. The scaling argument is supported by the empirical results and numerical simulations.
V.1. Preferential Attachment and Geography-Dependent Mechanism
Although the competition network studied here represents data collected at particular time point, it is the result of a specific development path of network dynamics that involve firm entries and exit as well as the formation and dissolution of competition links. The heavy tail characteristic displayed by the out-degree distribution of the competition network (Figure 1) points to the possibility that the formation of competition networks could be governed by a preferential attachment rule [8] . Figures 3 and 4 show that firms compete according to the distance between them, signifying that the formation of links is also geometrical in nature.
Moreover, the strong correlation between firm and population distributions (Figure 2 ) means that any model of competition should take into account the concentration of firms in highly populated areas.
The preferential attachment and geography-dependent mechanisms can be explained using substantive concepts that pertain to the nature of competition. In economics, "barriers to entry" refer to circumstances that make it very difficult or costly for a potential new entrant to compete with established firms that are already selling competing goods or services. Accordingly, incumbent firms with few competitors ("lower degree" as in a monopoly) have high entry barriers; and incumbent firms with lots of competitors ("higher degree" as in perfect competition) have low entry barriers. The preferential attachment mechanism --where the more competitors a firm has (and thus the lower the entry barrier), the more likely it is to receive new competition links --is a dynamic manifestation of the barrier-to-entry effect. The preferential attachment rule can also be explained in terms of "spin-out" companies of established firms. Accordingly, it is more likely that incumbent firms with many competitors will attract more competition links from "spin-out" companies of the direct competitors. The geography-dependent mechanisms can be explained in terms of the benefits for firms to cluster near one another. One of these benefits is the knowledge spillover that occurs among firms (within and between industries), which fosters the exchange of ideas and rapid adoption of innovation.
We therefore seek a model that considers the interplay between preferential attachment, geographic distance, and population density effects. A real understanding and modeling of competition networks should be able to reproduce empirically observed characteristics of competition networks -such as the degree and link length distributions reported in Figures 1 Page18 and 4 -as natural outcome of a minimal set of general mechanisms governing the formation of competition networks.
Network growth models including geographical distance of nodes [14, 25, 26] are a natural modeling approach for competition networks. We identify points on the curved surface of the Earth by their latitude and longitude coordinates, and compute geographic distances using the great circle distance between pairs of points on the surface of a sphere. We then superimpose on the map a grid consisting of two sets of parallel longitude and latitude lines, dividing the Earth's surface into squares (for our numerical simulations, we use high resolution data that consists of boxes of 0.0083° × 0.0083°). At each box, the population density is calculated from population data by dividing the population of each box by its area in square kilometers. In the following, firms are distributed on the Earth's surface by sampling from the population density distribution.
We start with 0 m firms, each pair connected by a competition link, and at each subsequent step the network grows with the addition of new firms. For each new firm, m new directed competition links are created connecting it to firms already present in the system. The exponentially truncated power-law distribution of the outgoing connections ( Figure 1 ) suggests the use of a nonlinear preferential attachment rule [1, 3] , which generalizes the linear preferential attachment mechanism that results in a power-law degree distribution [8] . This, combined with the fact that the competition probability tends to decrease with geographic distance according to a power-law, offers the possibility that the growth of competition networks is governed by a nonlinear preferential attachment rule modulated by a link length dependent factor. More specifically, the firms j receiving the new links from firm i are chosen with probability proportional to
, where j k is the total degree of firm j; ij l is the length in kilometers of the directed link from i to j; α and β are continuously varying parameters.
We have tested the validity of the above model by conducting several extensive That is, the null model maintains the growing character of the network, but the "preferential attachment" and "friction of distance" are eliminated by assuming that a new firm is connected with equal probability to any firm in the system. In addition, we examine three extreme cases of the competition network model: (1) Linear Preferential Attachment: α = 1, β = 0; (2) Gravity I: α = 0, β = −1; and (3) Gravity II: α = 0, β = −2. The first case corresponds to the scale-free network model developed by Barabasi and Albert [8] where an already present firm receives a new competition link a according to a linear preferential attachment rule, that is, with probability
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proportional to its degree. The second and third cases reflect a variety of gravity models in social science that are based on the empirical principle that proximity in geographic (and social) space affects the likelihood of interaction [43] [44] [45] [46] . Validation and accuracy assessment of the various network growth models is performed by visual comparisons (see Figures 6-9 In order to test for the effect of geographical distance bias on the competition network growth, we have held the "preferential attachment" parameter α at its optimal value 0.85 and have varied the "friction of distance" parameter β set at values 0, −0.3, −1, and −2. Figure 7A shows how a decrease in the value of β leads to a significant bias towards shorter links.
However, Figure 7B shows that the out-degree distributions are almost not affected by the value of β, when α is set at the optimal value 0.85. This indicates that the parameter α has a strong effect on the out-degree distribution, and weak effect on the link length distribution. Testing for the effect of preferential attachment on the competition network growth further corroborates this finding. This is done by experimenting with varying values of α, when β is set at the optimal value −0.3. As shown in Figures 8A and 8B , while the link length distributions for varying α are not changed and are similar to the actual distribution, the out-degree distributions deviate significantly for values of α that are different from the optimal value 0.85. These results imply that the actual link length distribution is determined to a large extent by the "friction of distance" parameter β, and weakly so by the "preferential attachment" parameter α. Overall, firms are distributed on the surface of the contiguous U.S. by sampling from the population density distribution; and (2) Random Location: firms are distributed randomly and uniformly on the surface of the contiguous U.S. Figure 9B shows that both firm placement schemes give similar results when comparing their out-degree distribution results with that of the observed data. However, as shown in Figure 9A , the link length distribution produced by the random location scheme deviates significantly from that produced by both Competition model 1 and the actual competition network. In summary, Figures 6-9 provide good evidence that the structure of competition networks can be better explained by taking into account network dynamical growth, 
V.2. Fitness and Geography-Dependent Mechanism
While the first model presented in Section V.1 largely assumes that the competition network evolves according to an "internal" mechanism ("preferential attachment"), where the future topology is determined by past ones, it is possible that the topology of the competition network is determined by "external" information in the form of an intrinsic quantity or "fitness" associated with each company in the network. Here, we consider the size of a company in terms of the numbers of employees [69] as the natural candidate to be identified with the fitness associated with each company in the competition network (similar results are obtained when measuring size 
leading to the relation between the three scaling exponents:
The significance of this result is that the right-skewed property characterized by the firm size distribution can be related to more fundamental scale invariant properties, characterized by the two exponents γ and δ. Equation (3) is confirmed for the competition network analyzed here.
The calculation of γ ≈ 1.6223 using maximum likelihood estimation (see Table B .2 in Appendix B) and equation (3) gives rise to σ = 1.5816, which agrees pretty nearly with the value of the exponent σ ≈ 1.5925 as obtained by using maximum likelihood estimation to the Page26 firm size data (see Figure 10B) . The heuristic utility of the scaling result can be seen by applying the population density distribution, and the probability of attracting more competition links tends to decrease with geographic distance; (2) the probability of attracting more competition links increases with the size of the company; and (3) the firm size dynamics follows a Gibrat-like stochastic growth process in which growth rates are independent of size [73] , and in which firm sizes are not allowed to fall below a lower bound that can change over time [71, 72] . As far as we know, there is limited effort in the network literature to connect models of "fitness" dynamics (in our case, firm size dynamics) with models of network formation (in our case, dynamics of linkage formation).
More specifically, we start with 0 m firms, each pair connected by a competition link, and at each subsequent step the network grows with the addition of new firms, which are assigned a size of "one" arbitrary unit. For each new firm, m new directed competition links are created connecting it to firms already present in the system. The scaling relation between firm size and degree ( Figure 10A ) suggests the use of a nonlinear cumulative advantage rule, where the probability of attracting more competition links increases with the size of the company. More specifically, the probability of attaching to an existing firm ݆ is proportional to ‫ݏ‬ ݈ ஒ , where ‫ݏ‬ is the current size of firm j; ݈ is defined as in Competition model 1; and ν and β are continuously varying parameters. Once the new node is attached, the sizes of already existing firms in the system are changed according to a Gibrat-like process with a reflective lower bound, known as the Kesten process [71, 72] . In particular, we use the model presented in [71] , where at each step a firm is randomly selected and updated according to the following stochastic rule:
where 0 ≤ ܿ < 1 is a constant factor, ‫̅ݏ‬ ‫)ݐ(‬ is the average size of firms at time ‫,ݐ‬ and λ(t) is a random growth rate drawn from a given density function ݂(λ) that satisfies ‫‬ λ݂(λ) ݀λ = 1 .
Here we use, without loss of generality [71] , a uniform distribution in the range λ ୫୧୬ ≤ λ ≤ Page28 λ ୫ୟ୶ . The stochastic growth process in Equation (4) 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have analyzed a large inter-organizational network where the nodes are firms located in the U.S. and directed links represent competition by the nodes forming the link. We focused first on topological properties, and have shown that the competition network exhibits a noticeable asymmetry between the exponentially truncated power law distribution of outgoing competition 
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Page29 links and the exponential law governing the in-degree distribution. This characteristic, which is consistent with results of other complex networks [5, 48] , can be explained as follows: Firms are not regarded as passive economic entities, but the actions taken by firms could also be seen as determined by and affecting the behavior of other competitors. The exponential law governing the in-degree distribution could indicate a limitation on the firm's capacity to compete with (and thus affecting) many firms, while the power law governing the out-degree distribution could reflect the ability of competition networks to minimize the effects caused by major events or changes that require significant adjustment in firm behavior. Indeed, the power-law behavior of the out-degree distribution implies that there are only a few firms with many outgoing competition links (i.e., affected by many others), which means that most of the time the competition network will display a low sensitivity to network perturbations. Altogether these results suggest that the structure of competition networks tend to stabilize the dynamics of competition.
The geographical aspect of the competition network has been analyzed in three ways. First, we have shown that the spatial distribution of companies is strongly correlated with the population distribution. This finding emphasizes the important role of environmental and exogenous mechanisms as context for network formation. Second, we have shown that geographic proximity increases the probability of competition following a power law, characterized by a scaling coefficient ("friction of distance") which is considerably lower than values used in other gravity-based models. This result could be explained, for instance, as a consequence of improvements in transport efficiency or communications technology, both of which tend to reduce the value of the friction of distance β. Third, we have analyzed the physical distance between firms, and have shown that the link length probability distribution is well fitted by a power law with exponential decay distribution with many very short links of length less or equal to 100 km, and extended link lengths of up to 4000 km. This is indicative of the tendency of competition networks to agglomerate into geographic concentrations ("clusters") of interconnected firms with characteristic size of about 100 km, and with competition links of varying lengths between separate clusters.
Motivated by the above empirical observations, we have proposed two models for the formation of competition networks, which are grouped in two classes according to whether the connection probability is determined by information that is internal ("degree") or external ("firm size") to the network. By comparing simulation results with the empirical observations of the competition network, we have demonstrated that both models are able to reproduce observed characteristics. The competition network models share two common features that provide insights into the factors governing the origin of competition networks: (1) spatial locations of firms, which are positively correlated with the population density; and (2) stochastic incremental growth governed by nonlinear cumulative advantage rule (determined by "degree" or "firm size") modulated by geographic distance. We have shown that the "degree" of a firm in the competition network (internal property) and its "size" (external property) can be treated on equal footing.
This leads to the intriguing possibility that both "degree" and "firm size" are two instances of "market competition signals," by which a company conveys information to potential new competitors about the future possibility of success once competition is established.
The model and results presented here are a step towards a coherent model of interfirm competition network formation in particular, and dynamic perspective of economic geography in general. More research is needed in several directions. In this paper we consider the entry of new firms, their links, and dynamics of firm size as the only processes affecting the formation of the network. However, a more realistic description of the formation of competition networks should take into account the effect of various local events on the large topology of the network, including the formation of new competition links between existing firms, dissolution of existing competition links, shifting (or rewiring) of existing competition links, exit of existing firms, and
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merging of existing firms. The relative frequency of these local processes will determine (combined with geographic and population density effects) to a large degree the structure of competition networks. Moreover, other tie formation mechanisms operating at the microlevel could be considered such as similarity/dissimilarity in size, performance, or financial indicators between pairs of potential competing firms. While it is theoretically possible to incorporate the above modifications, the scarcity (at this point) of longitudinal competition and firm-specific data over significant time periods make it difficult to validate the model or parameterize it for simulation and prediction purposes.
The simple competition models introduced here offer an evolutionary perspective on economic geography and market structure that significantly extends traditional notions of economic competition and geographical clusters. Combined with proper models of competition dynamics, it also opens up a new range of empirical and analytic possibilities in realistically examining the effect of interfirm competition on firm performance, strategy dynamics, price and output changes, technology diffusion, the emergence of fast-growing geographic clusters (hot spots), and many other phenomena of industry dynamics (e.g., "Red Queen" dynamics [56]).
Finally, the model provides a framework to study the ability of competition networks to be resilient (robust) to firm and economic fluctuations.
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APPENDIX B. FITTING PARAMETRIC DISTRIBUTIONS

B.1 Common parametric statistical distributions
We have considered several common functional forms for the various distributions (indegree, out-degree, and link length distributions) examined in this paper. 
B.2. Estimating the parameters of the parametric distributions
Nonlinear least squares is a general method for estimating the unknown parameters of a probability density function. However, the nonlinear least squares estimators are inefficient, and generate significant systematic errors under relatively common conditions [57] . For this reason, we use in this paper an alternative estimation technique, the maximum likelihood method, for fitting the parameterized models in Table B .1 to observed data. The likelihood function is the joint probability of the data, treated as a function of the unknown coefficients. The maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) of the unknown parameters consists of the values of the parameters that maximize the likelihood function [60] . The ML estimators are consistent, asymptotically efficient, and asymptotically normally distributed [60] . The ML estimators of the various models' parameters are shown in Tables B.2 Likelihood ratio tests. We compare two competing distribution models by calculating the logarithm R of the ratio of their two likelihoods [57, 61] . This is equivalent to calculating the difference in their log-likelihoods. The first case to consider is when the two distributions are nested; meaning that all of the parameters of the smaller model must also be in the bigger model. For example, the "power law" distribution is nested within the "power law with exponential cutoff" distribution (see Table B 
. It is known that this test statistic is distributed as chi-square with degrees of freedom that are the difference between degrees of freedom for the bigger and smaller models [61] . For non-nested hypotheses, we use a method proposed by Vuong [62] . This method computes a p-value that indicates whether the observed value of R (with a positive or negative sign) is statistically significant, and is thus sufficiently far from zero. A small p-value indicates that it is unlikely that the observed value of
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R has occurred by chance, and that one model could be said to be a better fit to the data. More specifically, the p-value of the above test is given by )
, where the function ) ( erfc x is the complementary error function, n is the sample size, and σ is the standard deviation of R (see [57] for a nice exposition of this method). TABLE C.1: Direct comparison of the out-degree probability distribution models estimated in Table B. 2. For each distribution model, we give the maximized log likelihood, and the likelihood ratios for the alternatives relative to the distribution model with the largest log-likelihood value ('stretched exponential'). In all cases, we use the likelihood ratio tests for non-nested hypotheses, and quote the normalized log likelihood ratio σ n R 2
. Based on the the pvalues generated by the likelihood ratio tests, we denote whether the normalized log-likelihood ratios are statistically significant at the * 5%, ** 1%, or *** 0.1% level. The results provide support for the stretched exponential distribution over the alternatives. 
APPENDIX D. DIRECT COMPARISON OF COMPETITION PROBABILITY MODELS
Visual inspection of Figure 3 --which shows the probability
companies separated by a distance l are related by a competition link --leads us to consider the alternative competition probability models presented in Table D. 1. 
D.1. Estimating the parameters of the competition probability models
Theoretically, the maximum likelihood method described in Appendix B.2 could be used for fitting the parameterized models in Fitting parametric distributions to the competition probability in Figure 3 . The parametrized models are fitted to the observed data using the method of nonlinear least-squares estimation.
D.2. Comparing the competition probability models
We have used two ways when comparing the overall fit of the competing models. The first way employs the method of least squares presented above. Specifically, we measure the overall model fit by the mean squared differences between the actual and predicted competition probability values as shown in the third column (labeled "MSE") of Table D. 2. The value of the MSE, however, will not reliably indicate which model is the better fit. In order to make a reliable choice between the competing models, we use the log likelihood ratio test described in Appendix C. To this end, we specify the likelihood function as follows. Let ) , ( Table D. 3. The likelihood ratio tests show that both the "power law" and "power law with exponential cutoff" are a better fit than both the "Bernoulli" model ( ≤ p 0.1% and 0.1%, respectively) and the "exponential" model ( ≤ p 1% and 5%, respectively). Moreover, when comparing the "power law" and "power law with cutoff", the large value -p (0.9557) tells us that the difference in their log-likelihoods is not statistically significant, and that the test does not favor either model over the other. By the parsimony principle, we choose the 'power law' competition probability model with a smaller number of parameters. The results indicate that both the "power law" and "power law with exponential cutoff" are a better fit than both the "Bernoulli' and 'exponential" models, and that the "power law" is a plausible alternative to the "power law with exponential cutoff."
APPENDIX E. COMPARISON OF COMPETITION NETWORK MODELS
In this appendix we describe the method used to calibrate and compare the different network growth simulation models described in Section V, and the results obtained. 
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The results of this procedure are shown in Tables E.1 
